Harris County Hospital District v. Tomball Regional Hospital, No. 05-0986, 52 Tex.S.Ct.J. 680 (Tex. 2009) continues trend that "sue and be sued" does not mean waiver of sovereign immunity, it just means you can be sued (and dismissed).

When an entity’s organic statute provides that the entity may ‘sue and be sued,’ the phrase in and of itself does not mean that immunity to suit is waived. Reasonably construed, such language means that the entity has the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name, but whether the phrase reflects legislative intent to waive immunity must be determined from the language’s context.

Do not try this reasoning in your regular work, since words usually still have meaning.  However, once the Supreme Court adopts the Humpty Dumpty rule, the practice of law becomes more problematic.

'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.' 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master—that's all.'

Lewis Carroll (1832-1898), Through the Looking Glass, http://www.famousquotes.com/show/1018079/

Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. v. Harris County Toll Road Authority, 282 S.W.3d 59, 68-70 (Tex. 2009) holds that a mandatory statute requiring a county to include cost of relocating utilities in right of way acquisition, is NOT a waiver of sovereign immunity if they do not pay for such cost of relocation.  All they have to do is include the cost in the calculation.  In other words, the Legislature is found to have mandated a needless calculation, rendering the mandate as mere surplusage.

67 Tex. Jur. 3d Statutes § 121, Giving effect to every part

[A] construction should not be adopted, if it can be avoided, that will render any part of the act inoperative FN4] or useless. FN5]

[FN4] Duke v. University of Texas at El Paso, 663 F.2d 522, 1 Ed. Law Rep. 512, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1389, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶32290 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 669 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1982) and appeal after remand, 729 F.2d 994, 16 Ed. Law Rep. 1031, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 982, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶34319 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982, 105 S. Ct. 386, 83 L. Ed. 2d 320, 34 Ed. Law Rep. 1003, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 234, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶34747 (1984) and (distinguished by, Rubinstein v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 145 Ed. Law Rep. 924, 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1059, 78 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶40188, 47 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 836 (5th Cir. 2000)); Spence v. Fenchler, 107 Tex. 443, 180 S.W. 597 (1915); Dupree v. State, 275 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1955), writ refused n.r.e., (Apr. 20, 1955); Orsinger v. Schoenfeld, 269 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1954), writ refused n.r.e.; Rogers v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 214 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1948), judgment aff'd, 147 Tex. 617, 218 S.W.2d 456 (1949) (distinguished by, Lopez v. Lone Star Beer, Inc. of Corpus Christi, 465 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1971)).

[FN5] City of Deer Park v. State ex rel. Shell Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1953), judgment aff'd, 154 Tex. 174, 275 S.W.2d 77 (1954) and (distinguished by, Bean v. Town of Vidor, 440 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Civ. App. Beaumont 1969)) and (holding limited on other grounds by, Laidlaw Waste Systems (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1995)).