In Re Collins, No. 07-0737, 52 Tex. S. Ct. J. 813 (Tex. 2009).  See also Durst v. Hill Country Memorial Hospital, 70 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App. --- San Antonio 2001), which allowed ex parte communicatoin AFTER stating:

We recognize there are public policy reasons that would support a prohibition against ex parte contact between a plaintiff's treating physician and defendant's counsel.   See, e.g., Horner v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 597, 601 (S.D.Tex.1994) (when treating physician is interviewed ex parte by defense counsel, there are no safeguards against revelation of matters irrelevant to the lawsuit and personally damaging to the patient, and the potential for breaches in confidentiality can have a chilling effect upon the critically important underlying relationship);  Perkins v. United States, 877 F.Supp. 330, 332 (E.D.Tex.1995) (privately contacting a physician could expose the physician to civil liability or professional sanctions);  see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Woodard, 461 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting there is nothing in the rules requiring a party to grant his adversary the right to have access to the files of his doctors and other witnesses, together with the right to interrogate them outside of his presence and hearing).   Given the potential for disclosure of irrelevant (and thus privileged) information during ex parte communications, perhaps the wisest course of conduct is for defense counsel to obtain information from the plaintiff's treating physicians through formal discovery measures.   Nonetheless, this court has recently held that there is no specific rule prohibiting ex parte communications between a plaintiff's treating physician and defense counsel.   See Rios v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 58 S.W.3d 167 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2001, no pet.);   see also Hogue v. Kroger Store No. 107, 875 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding ex parte meeting between patient's doctor and defense counsel not *238 improper). [FN1]

FN1. In the absence of an opportunity for the Supreme Court to confront this issue, we would respectfully invite appropriate committees of the State Bar of Texas to craft more specific guidance to counsel on both sides of the bar.

Of course the Supreme Court has now spoken.  Gone are the days of Mutter v. Wood, 744 S.W.2d 600, 601 (Tex.1988).

In this case, the privilege was waived completely as to the defendant doctors and partially as to the treating doctors. To the extent, however, that the treating doctors had records or communications which were not relevant to the underlying suit, they remained privileged until the judge ordered their complete waiver. The question, then, is whether Judge Wood abused her discretion in ordering Mutter to execute a 509(d)(2) waiver of the privilege. We hold that she did.

In effect, defense lawyers can sandbag the very doctors treating the plaintiff, without the plaintiff even knowing ... until it is too late.