A corporation's knowledge, however, is not limited to what its officers know, but may include other employees' knowledge, if those employees are corporate vice-principals. The employees who made the defamatory statements here, although not officers, were found to be corporate vice-principals. They were also found to have knowledge that their statements were false when made. The corporation thus knew, through its vice-principals, that the defamatory remarks were false when made and its knowledge, as a named insured, was sufficient to invoke the known-falsity exclusion. We accordingly disagree with the court of appeals' application of the known-falsity exclusion and conclude that the policy did not provide liability coverage for the underlying defamation claim in this case.

Chrysler Ins. Co. v. Greenspoint Dodge of Houston, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Tex. 2009).  The question is, whether this standard will apply when a plaintiff seeks relief against a corporation, because it "knew" something.  If a high level manager sees a wet spot on the floor of Wal-Mart, does Wal-Mart "know" about the dangerous condition?  See Keetch v. Kroger Co.,
845 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. 1992), where creating the condition is not enough, by itself, to "know" about the condition.